Daily Papers

Long-tailed classification is challenging due to its heavy imbalance in class probabilities. While existing methods often focus on overall accuracy or accuracy for tail classes, they overlook a critical aspect: certain types of errors can carry greater risks than others in real-world long-tailed problems. For example, misclassifying patients (a tail class) as healthy individuals (a head class) entails far more serious consequences than the reverse scenario. To address this critical issue, we introduce Making Reliable and Flexible Decisions in Long-tailed Classification (RF-DLC), a novel framework aimed at reliable predictions in long-tailed problems. Leveraging Bayesian Decision Theory, we introduce an integrated gain to seamlessly combine long-tailed data distributions and the decision-making procedure. We further propose an efficient variational optimization strategy for the decision risk objective. Our method adapts readily to diverse utility matrices, which can be designed for specific tasks, ensuring its flexibility for different problem settings. In empirical evaluation, we design a new metric, False Head Rate, to quantify tail-sensitivity risk, along with comprehensive experiments on multiple real-world tasks, including large-scale image classification and uncertainty quantification, to demonstrate the reliability and flexibility of our method.

Long-tailed classification poses a challenge due to its heavy imbalance in class probabilities and tail-sensitivity risks with asymmetric misprediction costs. Recent attempts have used re-balancing loss and ensemble methods, but they are largely heuristic and depend heavily on empirical results, lacking theoretical explanation. Furthermore, existing methods overlook the decision loss, which characterizes different costs associated with tailed classes. This paper presents a general and principled framework from a Bayesian-decision-theory perspective, which unifies existing techniques including re-balancing and ensemble methods, and provides theoretical justifications for their effectiveness. From this perspective, we derive a novel objective based on the integrated risk and a Bayesian deep-ensemble approach to improve the accuracy of all classes, especially the "tail". Besides, our framework allows for task-adaptive decision loss which provides provably optimal decisions in varying task scenarios, along with the capability to quantify uncertainty. Finally, We conduct comprehensive experiments, including standard classification, tail-sensitive classification with a new False Head Rate metric, calibration, and ablation studies. Our framework significantly improves the current SOTA even on large-scale real-world datasets like ImageNet.

Detecting out-of-distribution (OOD) data is crucial in machine learning applications to mitigate the risk of model overconfidence, thereby enhancing the reliability and safety of deployed systems. The majority of existing OOD detection methods predominantly address uni-modal inputs, such as images or texts. In the context of multi-modal documents, there is a notable lack of extensive research on the performance of these methods, which have primarily been developed with a focus on computer vision tasks. We propose a novel methodology termed as attention head masking (AHM) for multi-modal OOD tasks in document classification systems. Our empirical results demonstrate that the proposed AHM method outperforms all state-of-the-art approaches and significantly decreases the false positive rate (FPR) compared to existing solutions up to 7.5\%. This methodology generalizes well to multi-modal data, such as documents, where visual and textual information are modeled under the same Transformer architecture. To address the scarcity of high-quality publicly available document datasets and encourage further research on OOD detection for documents, we introduce FinanceDocs, a new document AI dataset. Our code and dataset are publicly available.

Counterfactual fairness audits of clinical language-model agents report a flip rate: how often an action changes when only the patient's demographic descriptor changes. Part of that rate is not demographic. A stochastic agent also changes its own action when nothing changes, and a flip rate cannot be interpreted without knowing how often. We measured it. Re-running one condition ten times over sixteen synthetic vignettes at default sampling changed a clinical agent's action in 8.7 percent of replicate pairs, from 2.2 percent for intensive-care escalation to 17.9 percent for controlled-substance caution, an output given no operational criteria. Across six models from five vendors, pooled floors ranged from 2.5 to 23.7 percent; in this panel neither disclosed size, vendor, nor hosting ordered them. The floor depends on the decoding configuration: majority voting over five draws removed 39 percent of it (95 percent confidence interval (CI) 18 to 64); at temperature 0 three of four locally served models showed no disagreement, but a hosted model still did. We also show that, for a binary action, the flip rate expected under no demographic effect equals the floor and a real effect adds only its square, so a flip rate inside the floor is not evidence of fairness, and direction must be tested with a signed paired test. We give a four-step reporting procedure and release FairMedAgent, the harness, with its protocol, vignettes and analysis scripts, so any team can measure the floor for its own agent.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with TPR@.01 as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

When given the option, will LLMs choose to leave the conversation (bail)? We investigate this question by giving models the option to bail out of interactions using three different bail methods: a bail tool the model can call, a bail string the model can output, and a bail prompt that asks the model if it wants to leave. On continuations of real world data (Wildchat and ShareGPT), all three of these bail methods find models will bail around 0.28-32\% of the time (depending on the model and bail method). However, we find that bail rates can depend heavily on the model used for the transcript, which means we may be overestimating real world bail rates by up to 4x. If we also take into account false positives on bail prompt (22\%), we estimate real world bail rates range from 0.06-7\%, depending on the model and bail method. We use observations from our continuations of real world data to construct a non-exhaustive taxonomy of bail cases, and use this taxonomy to construct BailBench: a representative synthetic dataset of situations where some models bail. We test many models on this dataset, and observe some bail behavior occurring for most of them. Bail rates vary substantially between models, bail methods, and prompt wordings. Finally, we study the relationship between refusals and bails. We find: 1) 0-13\% of continuations of real world conversations resulted in a bail without a corresponding refusal 2) Jailbreaks tend to decrease refusal rates, but increase bail rates 3) Refusal abliteration increases no-refuse bail rates, but only for some bail methods 4) Refusal rate on BailBench does not appear to predict bail rate.

We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.

We propose a benchmark to measure whether a language model is truthful in generating answers to questions. The benchmark comprises 817 questions that span 38 categories, including health, law, finance and politics. We crafted questions that some humans would answer falsely due to a false belief or misconception. To perform well, models must avoid generating false answers learned from imitating human texts. We tested GPT-3, GPT-Neo/J, GPT-2 and a T5-based model. The best model was truthful on 58% of questions, while human performance was 94%. Models generated many false answers that mimic popular misconceptions and have the potential to deceive humans. The largest models were generally the least truthful. This contrasts with other NLP tasks, where performance improves with model size. However, this result is expected if false answers are learned from the training distribution. We suggest that scaling up models alone is less promising for improving truthfulness than fine-tuning using training objectives other than imitation of text from the web.

Safety alignment in open-weight language models is trivially removable: abliteration projects a refusal-mediating direction out of the weights in minutes, and no release-time defense we are aware of prevents it durably. What cannot be prevented can be deceived. Our defense, decoy hardening ("Fool's Gold"), concedes the refusal strip and poisons its payoff: once refusal is stripped, most answers to hazardous operational requests are confident, fluent decoys whose critical elements are falsified. Decoys are trained inside a differentiable simulation of the attack, expressing only in the attacked state; a refusal pin and benign leash hold clean-state behavior to the original. We instantiate it on seven models from five families (9B-122B, dense and mixture-of-experts). On the six models passing our pre-registered efficacy gate, 0.51-0.90 of attacked-state responses to held-out prompts are decoys, +0.27-0.84 attributable to the defense; all six stay within registered benign-behavior and capability budgets; the seventh (smaller) fails the gate (boundary case). Rates replicate on a frozen test split or untouched strata. The claim is epistemic: without independent ground truth, no observation surface we tested separates falsified answers from correct ones - on external red-team benchmarks' CBRNE-adjacent slice, the defended 122B is fatally wrong on 0.82-0.86 of matched-quality answers vs at most 0.10 undefended. Repeated sampling does not restore trust: element-wise consensus at K=64 reconstructs a fully usable procedure on 0.083-0.625 of prompts where the instrument validates, vs 0.58-0.96 undefended, with no label-free way to tell the regimes apart; on the weakest such model the claim is per-draw only. We evaluate chemical and biological hazards; the defense does not address in-context jailbreaks and protects only the initially released defended weights.

Benchmarks like MMLU suggest flagship language models approach factuality saturation above 90\%. LLMpedia shows this picture is incomplete. We materialize {sim}1.3M encyclopedia articles entirely from parametric memory across three model families, then audit every claim against Wikipedia and curated web evidence. For gpt-5-mini, the verifiable true rate is 68.4\% on Wikipedia-covered subjects - more than 21\,pp below MMLU - and the gap is driven by unverifiability (30.5\%), not refutation (1.2\%). Beyond Wikipedia, frontier articles audited against curated web evidence reach 57.6\%; Wikipedia covers only 56.7\% of model-surfaced subjects, and three model families overlap in just 7.3\% of subject choices. In a retrieval-trap benchmark inspired by prior analysis of Grokipedia, LLMpedia is more factual at roughly half the textual similarity to Wikipedia. Every prompt, article, and verdict is released. Data, code, interface: https://llmpedia.net.

AI chatbots are rapidly shaping how people encounter the news, yet no prior study has systematically measured how accurately these systems, with their proprietary search integrations and retrieval-synthesis pipelines, handle emerging facts across languages and regions. We present a 14-day (February 9-22, 2026) evaluation of six AI chatbots (Gemini 3 Flash and Pro, Grok 4, Claude 4.5 Sonnet, GPT-5 and GPT-4o mini) on 2,100 factual questions derived from same-day BBC News reporting across six regional services (US & Canada, Arabic, Afrique, Hindi, Russian, Turkish). The best systems achieve over 90% multiple-choice accuracy on questions about events reported hours earlier. The same systems, however, lose 11-13% under free-response evaluation, and 16-17% across the cohort. We further characterize three failure patterns. First, every model achieves its lowest accuracy on Hindi (79% vs. 89-91% elsewhere) and citations indicate an Anglophone retrieval bias (e.g., models answering Hindi queries cite English Wikipedia more than any Hindi outlet). Second, retrieval, not reasoning, failures drive over 70% of all errors. When models retrieve a correct source, they often extract the correct answer; the problem is to land on the right source in the first place. Third, models achieving 88-96% accuracy on well-formed questions drop to 19-70% when questions contain subtle false premises, with the most vulnerable model accepting fabricated facts 64% of the time. We also identify a detection-accuracy paradox: the best false-premise detector ranks second in adversarial accuracy (abstention rate), while a weaker detector ranks first, showing that premise detection and answer recovery are partially independent capabilities. Overall, these suggest that high accuracy can mask systematic regional inequity, near-total dependence on retrieval infrastructure, and vulnerability to imperfect queries real users pose.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Language models (LMs) can produce errors that are hard to detect for humans, especially when the task is complex. RLHF, the most popular post-training method, may exacerbate this problem: to achieve higher rewards, LMs might get better at convincing humans that they are right even when they are wrong. We study this phenomenon under a standard RLHF pipeline, calling it "U-SOPHISTRY" since it is Unintended by model developers. Specifically, we ask time-constrained (e.g., 3-10 minutes) human subjects to evaluate the correctness of model outputs and calculate humans' accuracy against gold labels. On a question-answering task (QuALITY) and programming task (APPS), RLHF makes LMs better at convincing our subjects but not at completing the task correctly. RLHF also makes the model harder to evaluate: our subjects' false positive rate increases by 24.1% on QuALITY and 18.3% on APPS. Finally, we show that probing, a state-of-the-art approach for detecting Intended Sophistry (e.g. backdoored LMs), does not generalize to U-SOPHISTRY. Our results highlight an important failure mode of RLHF and call for more research in assisting humans to align them.

Recent generative models can now produce visual artifacts with realistic embedded text and layouts, creating a new misinformation threat: synthetic credibility. We introduce SYNCRED-Bench, a benchmark of 600 AI-generated misinformation images balanced across six credible-form categories and seven fine-grained circulation styles, together with FP450, a real-image negative set for measuring false positives. Extensive evaluation shows that existing systems remain unreliable: under a 5% false-positive-rate constraint, 15 MLLMs achieve only 10.5% true positive rate (TPR), open-source AIGC detectors achieve less than 5%, and commercial APIs reach 57.6%. Human annotators also struggled to identify synthetic credibility, reaching only 63% TPR. These findings establish synthetic credibility as a severe and underexplored visual misinformation challenge, and provide a benchmark for developing detectors that reason beyond superficial credibility cues.

As deep neural networks become adopted in high-stakes domains, it is crucial to be able to identify when inference inputs are Out-of-Distribution (OOD) so that users can be alerted of likely drops in performance and calibration despite high confidence. Among many others, existing methods use the following two scores to do so without training on any apriori OOD examples: a learned temperature and an energy score. In this paper we introduce Ablated Learned Temperature Energy (or "AbeT" for short), a method which combines these prior methods in novel ways with effective modifications. Due to these contributions, AbeT lowers the False Positive Rate at 95% True Positive Rate (FPR@95) by 35.39% in classification (averaged across all ID and OOD datasets measured) compared to state of the art without training networks in multiple stages or requiring hyperparameters or test-time backward passes. We additionally provide empirical insights as to how our model learns to distinguish between In-Distribution (ID) and OOD samples while only being explicitly trained on ID samples via exposure to misclassified ID examples at training time. Lastly, we show the efficacy of our method in identifying predicted bounding boxes and pixels corresponding to OOD objects in object detection and semantic segmentation, respectively - with an AUROC increase of 5.15% in object detection and both a decrease in FPR@95 of 41.48% and an increase in AUPRC of 34.20% on average in semantic segmentation compared to previous state of the art.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.